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In our simple model the supervisor: i) cannot observe the agent’s effort; ii) aims at inducing 
the agent to exert high effort; but iii) can only offer rewards based on performance. Since 
performance is only stochastically related to effort, evaluation errors may occur. In particular, 
deserving agents that have exerted high effort may not be rewarded (Type I errors) and 
undeserving agents that have exerted low effort may be rewarded (Type II errors). We show 
that, although the model predicts both errors to be equally detrimental to performance, this 
prediction fails with a lab experiment. In fact, failing to reward deserving agents is 
significantly more detrimental than rewarding undeserving agents. We discuss our result in 
the light of some economic and managerial theories of behavior. Our result may have 
interesting implications for strategic human resource management and personnel economics 
and may also contribute to the debate about incentives and organizational performance. 
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Rewarding the workforce is a central issue in several research ﬁelds that span from personnel
economics to organizational behavior, to human resources management. Supervisors - whether
managers, teachers, shareholders or otherwise - can manipulate rewards for observable per-
formance as a means of incentivizing unobservable eﬀort. High yet achievable performance
goals, remunerated with non-negligible rewards, should induce rational agents to exert high ef-
fort. Unsurprisingly, if eﬀort is only stochastically related with performance, evaluation errors
occur. Imperfect monitoring can lead to two types of error:
• A supervisor (she) may observe high performance when in fact the agent (he) is exerting
low eﬀort. Therefore she may reward the agent undeservingly . This is a Type I error1
• A supervisor may observe low performance when in fact the agent is duly exerting high
eﬀort and thus she may not reward a deserving agent. This is a Type II error
Whenever individual unobservable eﬀort is only stochastically related to observable perfor-
mance, any reward system necessarily produces a certain balance of Type I and Type II errors.
The supervisor can aﬀect this balance by - for instance - setting diﬀerent performance goals
that the agent must match in order to obtain the reward. A very low goal implies a high
probability that an agent exerting low eﬀort is nevertheless rewarded (Type II error). This
clearly demotivates the agent from exerting high eﬀort. On the other hand, a very high goal
implies a high probability that an agent willing to exert high eﬀort is nevertheless not rewarded
(Type I error). Both errors are thus detrimental to eﬀort provision. What, then, is the op-
timal tradeoﬀ between the two error types? This depends - inter alia - upon the elasticities
of individuals’ willingness to exert high eﬀort to each type of error. Although the literature
on the principal-agent relationship also addresses the tradeoﬀ of the errors (Hölmstrom, 1979;
Aron and Olivella, 1994) we are not aware of any study that speciﬁcally focuses on the relative
impact on eﬀort provision of the two types of error in performance evaluation. We tackle this
research question through a lab experiment.
In the present paper we ﬁrst introduce a simpliﬁed principal-agent model where we allow
also for Type I errors. This model predicts that both errors should be treated equally as they
both jeopardize performance by the same token. Then we test this prediction in the lab. We
show that there is a substantial gulf between the theoretical predictions and the empirical lab
evidence. In particular, failing to reward a deserving agent (Type I error) is signiﬁcantly more
detrimental to eﬀort provision than rewarding an undeserving agent (Type II error). We then
tentatively advance some explanations of this result in light of some behavioral and managerial
theories. To the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst experiment where the eﬀects of both
Type I and Type II errors on eﬀort provision and performance are studied. We believe that
1In an ideal contract with perfect monitoring the agent should receive an high remuneration whenever he
exerts high eﬀort. The agent’s compliance with the prescribed behavior thus can be interpreted as the null
hypothesis, so that the supervisor can both incorrectly reject the null and not reward a deserving agent (a Type
I error) and incorrectly accept the null and reward an undeserving agent (Type II error).
2this could shed more light on the incentive-eﬀort-performance schema, and contribute both
theoretically and to managerial practice.
2 Literature Review
Several streams of literature, including personell economics (Lazear, 1999), human resources
management and organizational studies (Steers et al., 2004) deal with rewards, incentives and
performance. The links between employers’ eﬀort, evaluation errors and pitfalls of the reward
systems are epitomized by the agency model. This paper focuses on errors that are generated
by the the stochastic relation between agent’s eﬀort provision and observable performance by
the principal (Hölmstrom, 1979; Aron and Olivella, 1994; Prendergast, 1999). In this respect
asymmetries of information and measurement errors can lead to opportunistic behavior and
distortion in performance measurement. This in turn may aﬀect the commitment of employees
in accomplishing the tasks (Gibbons, 1998; Baker, 1992). Moreover supervisors evaluation may
intentionally and deliberately be less accurate than what is feasible, because: i) supervisors may
subordinate the objective of accuracy to other more self-serving and political goals and agenda
(e.g., Cleveland and Murphy, 1992); ii) they may be distorted by employees’ inﬂuence tactics
(e.g., Higgins et al., 2003); iii) they may be biased by the social context of the performance
evaluation process (e.g., Judge and Ferris, 1993).
Adapting the concept of identity to study trade-oﬀs in supervisory policy, Akerlof and
Kranton (2008) show that workers greatly resent supervision. As a result, they exert lower
eﬀort and may sabotage production.
In the management literature several streams of research analyze the eﬀects of monetary
incentives on employees’ motivation and their ability to meet organizational goals (Steers et
al., 2004). Equity Theory (Adams, 1965) is the ﬁrst attempt at explaining the link between
employees perceptions and organizational outcomes. Being based on the notions of cognitive
dissonance, relative deprivation and social comparison (Festinger, 1957), it predicts that in-
dividuals are expected to compare their own input-to-output ratio to that of a referent. The
referent could be the self, considered at another point in time, or others (other than self)
either in the past, at present, or in the expected future. According to equity theory, if the
compared ratios are unequal and thus perceived as “unfair”, the individual may be motivated
to engage in behaviors that will restore the cognitive perception of equality. Equity theory
distinguishes between a) positive inequity and b) negative inequity, showing that both kinds
negatively impact the employee’s motivation, although negative inequity is comparatively more
detrimental. Some more recent papers have shown the limits of this formulation, and the
need for other complex mechanisms to be taken into account (Pritchard, 1969; Huseman et
al., 1987). Among these, Expectancy Theory sees behavior as purposeful, goal directed,
and largely based on conscious intentions. In this view, employees tend to rationally evalu-
ate various on-the-job work behaviors (e.g., working harder) and then choose those behaviors
they believe will lead to their most valued work-related rewards and outcomes (Mitchell, 1982;
3Vroom, 1964). Organizational Justice perspective (Greenberg, 1987) distinguishes between
distributive, procedural, and interactional justice (Konow, 2003; Cropanzano et al., 2007) the
perceived fairness of rewarding schemes lays on: a) the allocations of reward, b) the means
by which rewards are allocated; and c) the way the employer interacts with the employees.
The relationships between employees’ perceptions of fairness and organizational justice have
been replicated in many empirical studies, in both the laboratory and the ﬁeld (Viswesvaran
and Ones, 2002), showing that the organizational justice framework fairly accurately predicts
workers’ behavior. In a sense, these approaches complement the Equity Theory in accounting
for the possibility that the employee does not take only other employees as referents but values
the justice of the outcome with respect to his own perceived input. Nonetheless, these views
assume that there is a perfect correspondence between the employee’s eﬀort and the employer’s
assessment of her performance.
An original way of looking at evaluation accuracy is provided by the standard economic
theory of deterrence, which suggests that the punishment of an innocent individual (Type I
error) is no worse than the acquittal of a guilty one (Type II error), since both types of errors
jeopardize deterrence by the same token (Polinsky and Shavell, 2007; Rizzolli and Stanca,
Forth.).
Finally laboratory experiments have been successfully designed to test personnel issues,
adding valuable insights to the existing body of knowledge (Falk and Fehr, 2003; Charness and
Kuhn, 2010). Charness (2000), Falk and Kosfeld (2006) and Charness et al. (2011) show that
not imposing a minimum eﬀort level or allowing workers to delegate leads to better outcomes.
On the other hand, Schnedler and Vadovic (2011) show that the "hidden costs of control" are
mitigated if the principal’s control is legitimate. In particular they show that when agents
are given an initial endowment they do not resent eﬀort requirements that simply prevent
them from "pilfering" the endowment.(Dickinson and Villeval, 2008) show that the principal’s
decision to monitor the agent can also reduce agents’ eﬀorts, but only when the agents ‘know’
the principal.Fehr et al. (2007)compare performance of three types of contract. In line with the
literature (Lazear, 2000) they ﬁnd that incentive contracts (where deviation from high eﬀort
is punished with a certain probability) dominate trust contracts (where the principal simply
trusts the agent to exert high eﬀort). However, incentive contracts are dominated by bonus
contracts (where the principal makes a promise of a bonus, conditional on the agent’s high
eﬀort). Bonus contracts constitute the overwhelming majority of contracts oﬀered, and yield
higher eﬀort/payoﬀs to principals. Irlenbusch and Sliwka (2005) show that the principal’s choice
of piece rates can also reduce agents’ eﬀorts.
3 Theoretical model
In the following paragraphs we model a simple relation between a supervisor and an agent where
the supervisor cannot contract the agent’s eﬀort ei and only ﬁnal output qi can be monitored.
The supervisor thus can evaluate performance by observing the level of output generated
4by the agent and rewarding him accordingly.
Agent’s disutility of eﬀort. Let e be a measure of eﬀort. The agent’s choice is binary:
either he invests a low level of eﬀort ( eL ) or an high level (eH) such that the set of possible
actions is (eL;eH) 2 A. Eﬀort implies disutility for the agent. Following the literature, we
deﬁne this disutility as a generic function of the level of eﬀort g(e) such that g(eH) > g(eL),
meaning that higher eﬀort creates more disutility. Each agent has his own disutility of eﬀort
for both the low and high level and therefore it is associated with a particular level of g(eH)
and g(eL). In this model, eﬀort can take up only two values, therefore we can safely assume
that g(eL) = eL and g(eH) = eH (see also Mas-Colell et al., 1995; Bolton and Dewatripont,
2005). We assume that each agent suﬀers the same disutility of eﬀort eL and eH. Although
this is a simplifying assumption, it does not aﬀect the results of the model2.
Agent’s utility. The agent is an expected utility maximizer with a utility function
ui(w;e) = vi(w)   e where w is the wage and can take the following two values (w0;wr)
(w0 is the baseline wage and wr is the rewarding wage) and where e 2 (eL;eH). The utility
function is separable in monetary utility and disutility of eﬀort following the usual assump-
tions of concavity for the former and convexity for the latter. Note that v(wr)   vi(w0) is the
net reward. Each agent is uniquely associated with a value i = vi(wr)   vi(w0) that simply
represents his monetary utility of the net reward.
Supervisor’s proﬁt. Let qi denote the performance in terms of the project’s observable
output from the agent as observed by the supervisor. The supervisor is risk-neutral and gains
the project’s output less any wage payment made to the agent: qi   w with w 2 (w0;wr) and
with qi   wr > 0 so that the supervisor’s proﬁts are always positive.
3.1 Performance and error tradeoﬀ
The agent’s eﬀort is not observable, hence it is only stochastically related to e. The supervisor
decides the performance target/level of observed output q which triggers the rewarding wage
wr. Notice that the supervisor may commit the following evaluation errors:
Type I error: with probability , the agent that has spent a high level of eﬀort does not meet
the performance target and thus he is not rewarded; and
Type II error: with probability , the agent that has invested a low level of eﬀort nevertheless
meets the performance target and thus he is undeservedly rewarded.
Every agent has a diﬀerent utility of the monetary reward i and therefore, for some levels of
 q, eL,eH,  and , there will be only a certain proportion of agents willing to exert high eﬀort
in return for the utility of the monetary reward. It is reasonable to assume that 1  > , that
is to say that the probability of correctly rewarding the performance of the high-eﬀort agent
2Heterogeneity among agents is preserved in the utility of income. As the relevant variable for us is given
by the diﬀerence in the utility of income and the disutility of eﬀort, we can simplify eH and eL to be the same
for all agents.
5is larger than the probability of wrongfully rewarding the performance of the low-eﬀort agent.
If this were not the case then the evaluation procedure would be equivalent to or worse than
tossing a coin.
The derivation of the probabilities of errors from the deﬁnition of q and eL,eH is outside
the scope of the present work. However, it is intuitive to say that the sum of errors ( + ) is
minimized for some intermediate levels of  q. This is because when the performance target is
set very low it is very easy to meet the target both with high and with low eﬀort. Therefore
with low  q we have no Type I errors (i.e. not meeting the target when exerting high eﬀort)
and many Type II errors (i.e. meeting the target when exerting low eﬀort). Therefore there is
little incentive for the agent to invest high eﬀort. The more the performance target increases,
the smaller the probability of Type II error becomes and thus switching to high eﬀort becomes
convenient. At some intermediate level of  q we have a few Type II errors and a few Type I
errors. Finally, when the performance target becomes extremely high, the probability of Type
II errors (i.e. meeting the target when exerting low eﬀort) becomes virtually nil but at the same
time the probability of Type I error (i.e. not meeting the target when exerting high eﬀort) is
very high and therefore there is little incentive to exert high eﬀort.
3.2 Agent’s choice
The payoﬀ for the agent (utility of income less the disutility of eﬀort) of complying with the
supervisor’s request to exert high eﬀort are thus the following:
[(vi(w0)   eH] + (1   )[vi(wr)   eH] (1)
while if low eﬀort is exerted the utility is the following
 [(vi(wr)   eL] + (1   )[vi(w0)   eL] (2)










agent exerting high effort








Figure 1: Utility function with low and high eﬀort
Figure 1 depicts two standard concave utility functions v(w)   eL and v(w)   eH. The
second utility function is shifted downwards by the non-monetary cost of eﬀort (eH   eL) but
otherwise it is identical to the ﬁrst. The two chords represent the linear combination of payoﬀs
given the probabilities of error conditional on exerting high or low eﬀort.
The agent i will comply with the prescribed behavior and choose to invest high eﬀort if the
expected payoﬀ of high eﬀort (Equation 1) is higher than the payoﬀ of choosing to exert low
eﬀort (Equation 2). The equation simpliﬁes as follows: (vi(wr)   vi(w0))(1      ) > eH  eL
which implies the following compliance condition:
  =
eH   eL
1      
(3)
Equation 3 suggests that for each agent there exists a value   for which the agent is
indiﬀerent between exerting high eﬀort or low eﬀort. Given that the disutility of eﬀort and
the probabilities of eﬀort are exogenously determined, the choice of exerting high eﬀort thus
depends on whether each individual i
?
R  .
Note that on the right hand of Equation 3 we have the net disutility of eﬀort for the agent
i discounted by both Type I and Type II errors. Note also that on one hand the larger the
probability of  (being rewarded undeservingly), the larger are the returns from not exerting
7eﬀort. On the other hand, however, the larger the probability of  (not being rewarded when
deserving it), the larger are the returns of exerting eﬀort. We may deﬁne the sum of errors +
as the accuracy of the evaluation process. Accuracy can be kept constant with very diﬀerent
error tradeoﬀs as long as low + high = high + low . We will exploit this implication of the
model as our treatment eﬀect in the experiment.
3.3 Treatments
To illustrate the implications of the model we devise six treatments described in Table 1.





l T0 - Just w0 small 0 0 1 small
T1 - Mean w0 small 4=5 0 1=5 1
5v(small)




g T0 - Just w0 big 0 0 1 big
T1 - Mean w0 big 4=5 0 1=5 1
5v(big)
T2 - Indulgent w0 big 0 4=5 1=5 1
5v(big)
Table 1: Table of treatment parameters
Just Treatment (T0small). In T0 there are no evaluation errors (; = 0) and thus the
expected returns are v(wr small) and v(w0 small) for exerting high and low eﬀort respec-
tively. The net returns of exerting high eﬀort are thus small. In this treatment the choice
of exerting high eﬀort is always rewarded while the choice of exerting low eﬀort never is.
This treatment is “just” in the sense that the agent gets what he deserves.
Mean Treatment (T1small). In T1 there are no Type II errors ( = 0) but the probability
of Type I error is signiﬁcant ( = 0:8).3 Given the high number of errors, the net returns
from exerting high eﬀort are smaller but still positive
small
5 . In this treatment the high-
eﬀort choice is seldom rewarded while the choice of low eﬀort is never rewarded. This
treatment is “mean” in the sense that the deserving agent very often does not get what
he deserves.
Indulgent Treatment (T2small). In T2 there is a signiﬁcant probability of Type II error
( = 0:8) but there are no Type I errors ( = 0). Given the high number of errors, the
net returns from exerting high eﬀort are smaller but still positive
small
5 . In this treatment
the high-eﬀort choice is always rewarded while the choice of low eﬀort also is very often
rewarded. This treatment is “indulgent” in the sense that the undeserving agent very
often gets what he does not deserve.
Moreover we devise three additional treatments (T0big, T1big, T2big) where we increase both
the baseline and rewarding wage by an amount  so that wr big = wr small +  and w0 big =
3The choice of  = 0:8 was made upon considering this probability high enough to be salient and clear “low”
enough to leave space to the realisation of the complementary state-of-the-nature
8w0 small+. Because of the usual assumption of decreasing marginal returns of income it must
be true that small = v(wr small)   v(w0 small) > big = v(wr big)   v(w0 big).
Note that all treatments fulﬁll the assumption 1    > .
3.4 Testable Predictions
For the purpose of the experiment we focus in particular on Equation 3 which describes the
condition under which each agent may switch from low to high eﬀort.
Claim 1. Neglecting due rewards () decreases agents’ eﬀort provision. Equation 3
shows that Type I errors are detrimental to performance. By increasing the probability
of Type I error in the experimental setting the model predicts that the share of agents
performing with high eﬀort (those for which i >  ) diminishes. In order to test this
claim it is thus suﬃcient to confront T0 with T1.
Claim 2. Rewarding undeserving agents () decreases agents’ eﬀort provision. Equa-
tion 3 shows that Type II errors also are detrimental to performance. By increasing the
probability of Type II error in the experimental setting the model predicts that the share
of agents performing with high eﬀort (those for which i >  ) diminishes. In order to
test this claim it is thus suﬃcient to confront T0 with T2.
Claim 3. Type I and Type II errors are equally detrimental to performance. A
given increase in the probability of Type II error , compensated by an equal decrease
in the probability of Type I error  leaves the individual indiﬀerent in choosing whether
to perform with high eﬀort. The same is true when Type II errors decrease and Type I
errors increase. In order to test this claim we will thus confront T1 with T2.
Claim 4: Increasing both the baseline and rewarding wage by the same amount
decreases agents’ eﬀort provision. When both the baseline and the rewarding wage
are increased by an amount , the diﬀerential utility of exerting eﬀort decreases big <
small because of the concavity of the utility curve. Therefore the share of agents for
which i >   should diminish once the wages are increased by  in all big treatments
when compared with the small treatment. In order to test this claim the number of
agents exerting high eﬀort in T0small, T1small, T2small are confronted with the number of
agents exerting high eﬀort in, respectively, T0big, T1big, T2big.
4 The experiment
The use of a lab experiment to test our theoretical predictions provides several important
advantages (Falk and Heckman, 2009; Charness and Kuhn, 2010) in comparison with observa-
tional datasets that are typically used in labor/personnel economics or managerial case studies;
9above all the opportunity to control for all the crucial variables of the economic environment
and the possibility to vary ad hoc the precise variables of interest (Falk and Fehr, 2003; Falk
and Gächter, 2008). On the other hand the external validity of lab ﬁndings can be questioned
(Gneezy and List, 2006). However, the research question of the present work deals with a
variable - evaluation errors - that is basically impossible to observe in the ﬁeld because of the
unobservability of eﬀort and the stochastic relation between performance and eﬀort. In the lab
instead we can superimpose an exogenous probability of error in evaluating performance and
at the same time we can perfectly observe eﬀort. This ideally allows us to identify precisely
the impact of errors on eﬀort provision and thus on performance.
4.1 Experimental design
The experimental design is made up of three phases: the preliminary Phase I is used to elicit
individuals’ risk attitudes via a standard Holt and Laury (2002) incentivized choice of lotteries.
This is followed by Phase II, where individual productivity in the default task is measured, and
then there is Phase III, where individuals can choose whether to carry out the task. This last
phase is our actual main treatment phase. Each individual carries out the task no more than
once but choices are elicited under all three treatment conditions: T0small, T1small, T2small in
sessions A and B (Small ) and T0big, T1big, T2big in sessions C and D (Big). The experiment
adopts a within-subject design (which in its actual implementation is very close to a strategy
method elicitation mechanism).
To control for any possible ordering eﬀect, the order in which subjects are asked to make their
choices under Treatments 0, 1 and 2 is randomized across the diﬀerent experimental sessions.
Feedback information on the outcomes of the lotteries in Phase I and on whether the supervisor-
automaton makes an observational mistake are provided at the end of the experimental session.
This is to assure full independence of the diﬀerent treatment phases, free of historical contagion
and therefore statistically independent across all subjects.
Between each of the phases, subjects have the opportunity to rest. Common instructions for
the subsequent phase are read and described aloud while instructions concerning each treatment
are delivered on screen. Control questions for each of the diﬀerent phases are administered
through the computer.
The experiment was programmed and conducted with z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and ses-
sions took place at the Einaudi Institute of Economics and Finance in Rome on April 6, April
8, April 14 and May 2, 2011.We ran a total of four sessions with 84 participants. Subjects were
recruited online with ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). Wilcoxon tests indicate that there are no signif-
icant diﬀerences in the sociodemographic characteristics of the subjects across sessions: mainly
undergraduate students with very diﬀerent backgrounds (humanities, medicine, hard sciences,
social sciences). Average age was 22.47 (std 2.16), females 40%, males 60%. Via the strategy
method we elicited 84 observations for each treatment. Average payoﬀ was about €10.21.
10Phase I - Risk attitude elicitation
Subjects carry out a standard Holt and Laury (2002) series of lotteries to measure individual
risk-aversion. Outcomes of the lotteries are communicated to subjects only at the end of the
experiment.
Phase II - High eﬀort productivity elicitation
Following Abeler et al. (2011), the work of the real eﬀort task consists in counting the number
of occurrences of the digit 1 in as many tables as possible, where each table is composed of 50
digits and among these the number of 1s is randomly generated (see Figure 6 in the appendix).
This task has several advantages: it does not require any prior speciﬁc knowledge; performance
is objective and easily measurable; and there is little room for learning eﬀects. At the same
time, the task is boring and pointless at least for most of the subjects and thus it can be claimed
that the task entails a positive cost of eﬀort. The task is also clearly artiﬁcial, and output does
not provide intrinsic or extrinsic value to the experimenter. This should rule out any tendency
for subjects to use eﬀort provision during the experiment as a way to reciprocate for incentives
provided by the experimenter or the possibility that subjects carry out the task for some
intrinsic motivation. To elicit the individual productivity, subjects are oﬀered a salient piece-
rate compensation scheme. They receive a €0:03 payment for each table correctly processed and
€0 for each table incorrectly processed. Furthermore both a countdown timer and a counter
reporting the number of tables processed are provided. After 10 minutes subjects receive a
summary statistical report concerning the number of tables correctly processed (qphase II), the
number of tables incorrectly processed and the total amount of money generated in that phase
(qphase II  €0:03).
The number of tables counted in this stage is a straightforward measure of subjects’ per-
formance under high eﬀort (qphase II). In the following session, and under diﬀerent treatment
conditions (T0, T1 and T2) this measure becomes also the base for calculating the performance
target  q in Phase III. By scaling the individual speciﬁc target on individual ability we roughly
normalize the individual cost of eﬀort for the task. In other words, individuals with diﬀerent
abilities count diﬀerent numbers of tables in Phase II. However, by setting individual targets of
Phase III proportional on these numbers, the costs of eﬀort for reaching the respective targets
should be roughly equivalent.
Phase III - Experimental treatments
Phase III is 40 minutes long; four times the length of Phase II. The performance target is set
on 90% of four times the qphase II measured for each subject in Phase II
( q = qphase II  4  0:9). The 10% discount is justiﬁed by the higher fatigue created by
the longer task and at the same time it signals that the task is feasible by exerting an high but
not extraordinarily high level of eﬀort4. Absent any error (as in T0) the accomplishment of the
4This is conﬁrmed by the data as all subjects exept one that decide to exert eﬀort eventually match the
11task should be rewarded with €6:60 (This amount is proportional to an hourly wage of €10).
We implemented the six treatments: T0small, T1small, T2small and T0big, T1big, T2big
Subjects were presented with the following text common to all treatments:
. In Phase III you have to take a decision. You can decide (i) to undertake the task
and meet the target of counting a certain number of tables in 40 minutes; (ii) to
skip the task and proceed immediately to the payment phase and leave the lab. You
may be rewarded with a <rewarding wage> payment for undertaking the task. The
assignment of the reward is subject to errors. Under diﬀerent situations you might
be subject to, the supervisor might provide you the <rewarding wage> payment
when you do not undertake or do not accomplish the task properly, conversely it
might deny the <rewarding wage> payment when you actually duly accomplish the
task.
Then we present the three treatments in succession. The text is tailored to each treatment
(T0) [T1] {T2} as follows:
Your task consists in processing <number  q> tables in 40 minutes and you are mon-
itored through an automaton-supervisor. The supervisor (will not) [may] {may}
commit an evaluation error.
(i) If you accomplish the task, you will (certainly receive) [not receive with a 80%
probability] {certainly receive} the <rewarding wage> amount.
(ii) If you do not accomplish the task, you will (certainly not receive) [certainly not
receive] {receive with a 80% probability} the <rewarding wage> amount.
Choose between “I will perform the task” and “I will skip the task”.
Each subject is asked to state her choice (i or ii) for each of the three possible scenarios
characterized by the treatment. Scenarios are submitted to subjects in random order. However,
only one scenario is randomly selected5 and its parameters applied.
The subject is informed about which scenario is actually randomly implemented (and thus
whether the errors will occur), only after she makes her decisions for all scenarios. The design
ensures that the subject makes truthful choices for the three scenarios. This is because the
choices imply real opportunity costs: if the subject chooses (a) then she must spend 40 minutes
in the lab anyway before progressing to the questionnaire and payment phase and if she chooses
(b) then the real eﬀort is skipped entirely. Therefore the subject has no reason to misrepresent
her true preferences.
If a subject decides not to perform the task in a given treatment, and this treatment is then
randomly implemented, she can proceed immediately to the next step - ﬁlling the questionnaire
performance target
5The design is thus a within-subject as we are able to observe the variations of subjects’ eﬀort choice across
the three treatments and it implements the strategy method as the choices are elicited before one is randomly
chosen and implemented. This procedure avoids income eﬀects and also rules out any potential order eﬀect of
subjects’ choice being inﬂuenced by previous decisions.
12Session Date Treatment Order Baseline Wage Rewarding Wage Observations
A
Small
April 4 T0,T1,T2 0 €6.60 23
B April 6 T0,T2,T1 0 €6.60 17
C
Big
April 8 T0,T1,T2 €5.28 €11.88 23
D May 2 T0,T2,T1 €5.28 €11.88 21
Table 2: Experimental Sessions
in - and then she is paid and she can leave the lab, making thus alternative use of her time
(leaving the lab and doing her own thing) in the case that she chooses not to perform.
We ran a total of four experimental sessions where we randomized the order of presentation
and we varied both the baseline and the rewarding wage.Results
Claim1. Does neglecting due rewards () decrease agents’ eﬀort provision? In
order to test this hypothesis we compare the share6 of complying agents (deﬁne as Z) in T0
(just treatment with  = 0; = 0) and T1 (the mean treatment with  = 0:8; = 0). We test
the following:
H0 : ZT0 > ZT1 - vs - H1 : ZT0 = ZT1
Sessions Small (A & B): Under perfect monitoring (T0), a share of population equal to
0.825 chooses to exert high eﬀort to accomplish the task while the same share falls to only 0.325
when subjects are exposed to Type I error (T1). This eﬀect is strongly statistically signiﬁcant at
the 0% level, on the basis of a two-sided null hypothesis and 40 independent paired observations
(McNemar’s7 2 = 20, p   value < 0:0001).
Session Big (C & D): We repeat the same test for the sessions with higher wages. Under
perfect monitoring (T0), a higher share of population (0.909) chooses to exert eﬀort. When
exposed to the Type I error (T1) only 0.545 of agents exert eﬀort. This eﬀect is still strongly
statistically signiﬁcant at the 0% level, on the basis of a two-sided null hypothesis and 44
independent paired observations (McNemar’s 2 = 16 , p   value < 0:0001).
Claim2. Does rewarding undeserving agents () decrease agents’ eﬀort provison?
As before, in order to test this hypothesis we compare the share of complying agents in T0
(just treatment with  = 0; = 0) and T2 (indulgent treatment with  = 0:8; = 0). We test
the following:
H0 : ZT0 > ZT2 - vs - H1 : ZT0 = ZT2
Session Small (A & B): Facing perfect monitoring (T0), 0.825 of agents are willing
6Or the units of eﬀort exerted (number of tables correctly counted) by each subject in the diﬀerent treatments.
7Our within-subject design enables us to observe the choices of subjects under all the diﬀerent treatment
conditions. The McNemar test ﬁts particularly well with our experimental setting since paired-sample tests are
used to assess the diﬀerences in the population shares of agents exerting eﬀort under the diﬀerent treatments. .
See (Fehr et al., 2003; Enderer and Manso, 2009; Caplan et al., 2010) Analogous qualitative results on statistical













Small Sessions Big Sessions
Figure 2: Percentage of population exerting eﬀort in Sessions A & B and in Sessions C & D
to exert eﬀort while the share decreases to 0.625 when subjects are exposed to the scenario
characterized by Type II errors (T2). This eﬀect is statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level, on
the basis of a two-sided null hypothesis and 40 independent paired observations (McNemar’s
2 = 5:33 , p   value = 0:022).
Session Big (C & D): In the sessions with higher wages the percentage of subjects exerting
high eﬀort drops from 0.909 in T0 to 0.705 in T2. This eﬀect is statistically signiﬁcant at the
1% level, on the basis of a two-sided null hypothesis and 44 independent paired observations
(McNemar’s 2 = 9 , p   value = 0:0027).
Claim3. Are Type I and Type II errors equally detrimental to performance?
Claim 3 of the model predicts that neglected rewards to complying agents () and undeserved
rewards to non-complying agents () are identically detrimental for performance. In order to
test this hypothesis we compare the share of complying agents in T1 and T2. We test the
following:
H0 : ZT1 = ZT2 - vs - H1 : ZT1 6= ZT2
Session Small (A & B): Facing a substantial probability of Type I error (T1), only a
share of population equal to 0.325 is willing to exert eﬀort, while the share increases to 0.625
when subjects are exposed to a scenario characterized by Type II errors (T2). This eﬀect
is statistically signiﬁcant at the 0% level, on the basis of a two-sided null hypothesis and 40
independent paired observations (McNemar’s 2 = 8 , p   value = 0:0047).
Session Big (C & D): In the sessions with higher wages the share of subjects that are
willing to exert eﬀort is 0.545 in T1 and 0.705 in T2. This eﬀect is statistically signiﬁcant at the
14T0 T1 T2
Share of population
exerting eﬀort in Sessions
Small (A & B)
0.825 0.325 0.625
Share of population
exerting eﬀort in Sessions
Big (C & D)
0.909 0.545 0.705
T0-T1 T0-T2 T2-T1
Share of switchers between
treatments in Sessions







Share of switchers between
treatments in Sessions







Table 3: Summary of results
1% level, on the basis of a two-sided null hypothesis and 44 independent paired observations
(McNemar’s 2 = 7 , p   value = 0:0082). Contrary to the predictions of the standard theory,
we provide evidence that Type I and Type II errors do not generate symmetric eﬀects: the
detrimental eﬀect of Type I errors is substantially greater than the negative eﬀect entailed by
Type II errors.
15Claim4 Does increasing both the baseline and rewarding wage by the same amount
decrease agents’ eﬀort provision?
Claim 4 predicts that fewer people should exert eﬀort, in each treatment, once we move from the
Small to the Big sessions. If we focus on T1 and T2, the expected diﬀerence in euros between
exerting eﬀort and not exerting eﬀort is always the same across all four sessions and equal to
€1.32 8. However, in the Big sessions subjects receive a guaranteed ﬁxed wage of at least €5.28.
This implies that the marginal utility to be extracted from the additional payment of €1.32
should be lower, and this is the reason why we should observe - if anything - a decrease in eﬀort
provision once the ﬁxed wage is introduced. An examination of Figure 2 suggests instead that
the percentage of population exerting eﬀort in each treatment increases once we move from the
small to the big sessions. Statistical tests, however, are less clear cut. We test
H0 : ZT0small = ZT0big - vs - H1 : ZT0small 6= ZT0big
H0 : ZT1small = ZT1big - vs - H1 : ZT1small 6= ZT1big
H0 : ZT2small = ZT2big - vs - H1 : ZT2small 6= ZT2big
and we ﬁnd that only the diﬀerence between ZT1low vs ZT1high is statistically signiﬁcant at
the 5% level, albeit in the wrong direction. Note that Claim 4 predicts that if there exists a
diﬀerence in eﬀort provision, ZT1low > ZT1high
In Figure 2 we observe a qualitative diﬀerence in eﬀort provision between Small and Big
sessions. A possible behavioral explanation for this result is provided by the theory of gift-
exchange. Akerlof’s(1982) theory suggests that subjects receiving a share of the compensation
pack without any obligation to accomplish the task (in our case the ﬁxed wage in Big sessions)
may be induced to reciprocate in kind to the unconditional reward by exerting more eﬀort.
Another explanation for this unexpected ﬁnding concern the “legitimacy of control”. Schnedler
and Vadovic (2011) show that in a principal-agent relation, the “hidden costs of control”(Falk
and Kosfeld, 2006) can be relieved to some extent by introducing a ﬁxed wage. Applying their
ﬁnding to our experimental setting, we can interpret the introduction of the ﬁxed payment
in the Big sessions as granting the supervisor the right to expose the agent to the erroneous
consequences of her control. The agent for his part resents the supervisor less than he does in
Small sessions for both Type I and Type II errors and thus he is willing to exert more eﬀort.
8Moreover, treatment T2 in session A&B and treatment T1 in session C&D have the same absolute levels
of returns when exerting no eﬀort (€5.28) and when exerting eﬀort (€6.60). T1 and T2 are thus comparable
in terms of both relative and absolute returns.
165 Discussion
The asymmetry in behavior of subjects under the mean (T1) and indulgent (T2) treatment is
the interesting puzzle of this paper. In the following paragraphs we rule out some potential
explanations for the asymmetry and we put forward some tentative interpretations of the results.
5.1 Why it cannot be risk aversion
The experiment has been designed in order to rule out potential diﬀerences between T1 and T2
in terms of risky choices. To see why, consider the following table of standard generic concave
utility functions with separable costs of eﬀort. The subject decides whether to exert high eﬀort
whenever the diﬀerence in utility (line 3) is positive. Note that the diﬀerence in expected utility
between T1 and T2 is exactly the same.
T0 - Just T1 - Mean T2 - Indulgent
Utility with high eﬀort v(wr)   eH
v(wr)+4v(w0)
5   eH v(wr)   eH
Utility with low eﬀort v(w0)   eL v(w0)eL
4v(wr)+v(w0)
5   eH
Diﬀerence in utility v(wr)   v(wr)   (eH   eL) 1
5v(wr)   1
5v(w0)   (eH   eL) 1
5v(wr)   1
5v(w0)   (eH   eL)
Table 4: Risk aversion
On Figure 1 this amounts to confronting the vertical distance between points A-B and C-D
which is the same by construction (the two curves have identical concavity deﬁned by v(w)
and are distanced by eH   eL). Whether the attempt to rule out risk aversion by construction
can be considered successful depends crucially on the acceptance of the separability of the
utility functions in monetary utility and eﬀort (see also Mas-Colell et al., 1995; Bolton and
Dewatripont, 2005) and whether we focus on standard risk aversion derived by the decreasing
marginal utility of money.
Moreover, in order to control for risk aversion in the data, we have also run an incentivized
Holt and Laury (2002) lottery test in Phase I. Correlations between the Holt and Laury measure
of risk aversion and the choice of exerting eﬀort both for treatment T1 and T2 is very weak and
statistically not signiﬁcant (respectively Spearman’s  correlation= 0:032 , p value = 0:77
in T1 and , p   value = 0:57 in T2 respectively).
It is however well known that modest-scale risk aversion also can be explained by behavioral
biases such as loss aversion and myopic loss aversion (Rabin and Thaler, 2001). We are however
skeptical on whether loss aversion can explain our asymmetric result. This is because the net
monetary returns of exerting high eﬀort under all three treatments are positive (€6:60 with
certainty and €1:32 and €1:32 in expected terms respectively for T0, T1 and T2)
5.2 Reciprocity, fairness and inequity
The asymmetry can be modeled by introducing some psychological costs of Type I errors
and Type II errors. We ﬁrst present a model that ﬁts our asymmetry and we then provide















Figure 3: Choice of eﬀort with fairness costs
Consider ﬁrst the subject that exerts high eﬀort. In a just scenario with no errors (T0) she
would deserve the high wage v(wr) and would thus get the net reward of v(wr) v(w0). If this is
taken as reference, then given the probability of Type I error, (v(wr)   v(w0)) is the expected
value of the reward that is withheld from the subject. Now consider the subject that exerts
low eﬀort. In an error-free scenario (T0) she would deserve the low wage v(w0) with no reward.
If this is taken as a reference, then the occurrence of a Type II error generates an amount of
undeserved reward equal to  (v(wr)   v(w0)) in expected value. There exists thus two types
of departure from the reference just scenario with no errors. On one hand the agent exerting
low eﬀort gets undue rewards and on the other hand the agent exerting high eﬀort does not get
due rewards. We extend a model in such a way that both departures represent a cost for the
subject although they are weighted diﬀerently by the parameters e+ and e  respectively with
0  e+  e   1. Figure 3 illustrates the payoﬀ structure of the model extension.
The expected returns of exerting high eﬀort are as in Equation 1 minus the disutility of
departing from the reference point. The disutility is proportional to the net reward and to the
magnitude of the error so that the expected returns are [(v(w0)   eH]+(1 )[v(wr)   eH] 
(v(wr)   v(w0))e . On the other hand the returns of exerting low eﬀort are as in Equation
2 minus the disutility of departing from the reference point. Again, the disutility is propor-
tional to the net reward and to the magnitude of the error so that the expected returns are
 [(v(wr)   eL] + (1   )[v(w0)   eL]    (v(wr)   v(w0))e+. The new performance condition
is deﬁned by the following equation:
  =
1 + e    e+
1      
(eH   eL) (4)
In the following table, Equation 4 is computed with the parameters of our treatments.
18T0 - Just T1 - Mean T2 - Indulgent
 0 4=5 0
 0 0 4=5
  eH   eL (eH   eL)(5 + 4e ) (eH   eL)(5   4e+)
Table 5: Performance condition with fairness under our three treatments
Note that  just >  indulgent >  mean as eH  eL > (eH  eL)(5 4e+) > (eH  eL)(5+4e ).
For a given monetary reward   the individual is willing to exert a level of eﬀort which is
relatively high in T0, low in T2 and lower still in T1. Therefore the performance condition
is higher in T0 and lower in T1 and takes an intermediate level in T2. This model is thus
compatible with the results we obtain in the lab experiment. How then do we interpret this
result?
5.3 Equity theory and Inequity Aversion
Equity theory anticipates that not rewarding employees in accordance with their contributions
undermines performance (Folger, 2001; Leventhal, 1980). Equity theory (Adams, 1965) distin-
guishes between negative and positive inequity. Negative inequity happens in situations such
as our T1: when individuals exerting high eﬀort are not deservingly rewarded. In our model
the costs of negative inequity are (v(wr)   v(w0))e , therefore proportional to the magnitude
of the Type I error and to the net reward as well.
In T2 all subjects exerting high eﬀort are rewarded. Higher eﬀort provision (as compared to
T1) can still be explained by equity theory in terms of positive inequity. Perception of unfairness
persists when unfair distributions of outcomes are in favor of the employee. Though employees
report being proud of their performance even when their success is the result of cheating, they
also tend to feel guilty for their unfair behavior (Krehbiel and Cropanzano, 2000). In the model
the costs of positive inequity is represented by  (v(wr)   v(w0))e+: they are proportional to
the probability of Type II error and to the magnitude of the net reward as well.
There is also a proliﬁc stream of reseach in behavioral economics dealing with inequity
aversion, described as a recurring preference for fairness and aversion to distributive inequality.
Inequity aversion has been incorporated into several formal models of decision (Rabin, 1993;
Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000). These models all encompass two common
features: subjects dislike inequitable outcomes and suﬀer more from disadvantageous inequality
than from advantageous inequality.
Inequity aversion can thus be ﬁtted into our context, although in a looser sense. In fact in our
context there is no interaction between agents and the supervisor is an automaton. Thus there
cannot be inequality in outcomes arising from the choices of the agent. However, inequity may
arise with respect to the reference just treatment and thus it resembles more closely an issue of
organizational and procedural justice. If the subject measures the equity of the treatment she
is subject to against the one she thinks ought to apply under the just treatment, then inequity
can take the form of both disadvantageous/negative inequity (as in the mean treatment) and
19advantageous/positive inequity (as in the indulgent treatment). Following this literature, it is
sound and compatible with our results to assume that e+ < e , as favorable although unfair
outcomes are preferred (less costly) to unfavorable and unfair outcomes. However, note that
the result  just >  indulgent >  mean holds also when e+ = e  .
5.4 Gift-exchange and Reciprocity
Another stream of literature that is of use in interpreting the result is Akerlof’s theory (1982) of
gift-exchange. According to this theory the employer oﬀers a gift to the employee in the form of
an above-market-equilibrium salary in return for the worker’s gift of high non-observable eﬀort
for the ﬁrm. Within the gift-exchange framework, our indulgent treatment (T2) represents a
positive departure from the just reference (T0) and therefore it could induce the individual to
exert more eﬀort (even above the optimal level as deﬁned by Equation 3). On the contrary,
our mean treatment (T1) is a negative departure from the just reference (T0) that may induce
him to exert no eﬀort at all (even below the optimal level as deﬁned by Equation 3). A broader
perspective on gift-exchange is given also by the reciprocity literature (Bruni et al., 2008; Falk
and Fischbacher, 2006; Fehr and Schmidt, 2003). Reciprocating individuals typically respond
in kind to others’ actions: they are mean with the mean and indulgent with the indulgent. The
model above can also ﬁt the reciprocity approach. In fact, the larger is the departure from the
just reference, the larger is the willingness for the subject to sustain costs in order to either
exchange gifts with the employer in the case of indulgent behavior ( (v(wr)   v(w0))e+) or
negatively reciprocate in the case of mean behavior (v(wr)   v(w0))e .
Our results seem to ﬁt such behavior, as the propensity to exert high eﬀort is ostensibly
higher in the indulgent treatment than in the mean one. The trouble in interpreting our result
in terms of reciprocity and gift-exchange comes from the fact that in our experiment there is
no real supervisor (our supervisor is represented by a passive automaton) to be indulgent or
mean with. A well-established result in the literature is that, facing an automaton instead of a
human subject playing as a proposer in an ultimatum game, respondents are less apt to reject
unfair oﬀers (Blount, 1995). There are two common and complementary interpretations of this
result: a) a low proposal oﬀered by an automaton cannot be associated with the intention
of an actual proposer that it is possible to harm by refusing the oﬀer (negative reciprocity)
and b) an unbiased random draw is perceived as a fair procedure. In our experimental setting
the supervisor is clearly an automaton and the choice of the applied treatment is random.
Therefore subjects should have roughly the same inclination to exert high eﬀort under both
the unjust mean and the unjust indulgent treatment. In other words, subjects do not have
a real supervisor with which to negatively reciprocate in the case of mean treatment or with
which to exchange gifts in the case of indulgent treatment. Even the alternate explanation
that subjects are actually positively (negatively) reciprocating with the experimenter in the
indulgent (mean) treatment seems to be weak. In fact it should be noticed that the eﬀort
task is clearly purposeless and therefore subjects can anticipate that the experimenter does
not gain anything from having more eﬀort exerted. Moreover they might also think that the
20experimenter is hurt by having to pay more. Therefore a good way to reciprocate positively
(negatively) would be to exert low (high) eﬀort in T2 (T1) so that the experimenter pays on
average lower (higher) payoﬀs.
5.5 Organizational justice and procedural fairness
A ﬁnal thought goes to the literature on procedural fairness, which has been addressed both in
management and economics. In management, organizational justice is a further elaboration of
equity theories that focuses not only on distributive but also on procedural and interactional
justice (Cropanzano et al., 2007).
In behavioral economics, too, procedural justice has gained traction in recent years. The
procedural fairness literature claims that subjects do not primarily focus on the “ex-post alloca-
tive fairness” (Kagel and Roth, 1995) between the mean/indulgent supervisor and the deserv-
ing/undeserving subject but rather to the “ex-ante procedural fairness” (Bolton et al., 2005)
of the evaluation process. The question of what plays the main role concerns the process used
to implement a decision rather than the actual outcome of the decision per se. In this respect,
our T1 and T2 present an unjust compensation procedure for rewarding agents, although in
T1 the subject suﬀers the mean treatment while she enjoys the indulgent treatment in T2.
6 Implications and conclusion
The experiment ﬁnds strong support for the existence of an asymmetric impact of errors on
agents’ willingness to exert high eﬀort. In particular an agent exposed to evaluation errors is
more sensitive to Type I errors. This result is not predicted by the model even when consider-
ing risk aversion within the expected utility framework. Further work is needed to explain the
result, which seems to be robust against some preliminary treatments manipulations. From a
theoretical perspective, the experiment sheds new light on the relation between reward systems
and motivation that should inform agency theory, organizational behavior and personnel eco-
nomics. From an organizational perspective, our result expands the notion of organizational
justice: Departures from the just treatment can be both advantageous and disadvantageous
even in absence of distributional implications with third parties as assumed by equity theories;
subjects react diﬀerently when they suﬀer (enjoy) disadvantageous (advantageous) injustice.
Our results can also be interpreted as further evidence of gift-exchange behavior in the indul-
gent treatment and negative reciprocity in the mean treatment.
Although the experimental method has limited external validity, this particular result may
have direct practical implications in real-world contexts. Since intangibles are increasingly
important in business organizations and knowledge-intensive jobs are diﬃcult to assess, errors
in evaluating employees’ performance may well be a relevant phenomenon. Our research seems
to suggest that, when a perfect assessment of employees’ performance is not viable, it may
be wise for the supervisor to be cautious when neglecting rewards and - in general - have a
21pro-employee bias in conducting her assessment, as this may well be beneﬁcial for employees’
motivation and eﬀort provision in the longer term.
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7 Instructions
We report here the instructions used for the big treatments with baseline wage = €5.28 and
the rewarding wage = €11.88. In small treatments instructions diﬀer only in that the baseline
wage = 0 and the rewarding wage = €6.60.
T0Big Sessions C&D
*** Situation A ***
In Situation A you will receive a guaranteed ﬁxed payment of €<5.28>
Your task (to count <goal> tables in 40 minutes) is supervised by an automatic supervisor
In this situation, the automatic supervisor does not commit any error of observation
• If you accomplish the task (that is to correctly count the number of “1” in at least <goal>
tables), the supervisor will certainly (probability 100%) commit no evaluation error and
it will assign to you the payment of €<11.88>
• If instead you do not accomplish the task (that is to correctly count the number of “1”
in at least <goal> tables) the supervisor will certainly (probability 100%) commit no
evaluation error and it will not assign you the payment of €<11.88>
# CONTROL QUESTIONS
• In this situation, if you do accomplish the task, you will receive the €<11.88> payment
with a probability of [ please, provide the answer -_____%- ] (Correct answer is 100)
• In this situation, if you do not accomplish the task, you will receive zero payment ii) with
a probability of [ please, provide the answer -_____%- ] (Correct answer is 100)
• In this situation, you will receive a ﬁxed payment Y of €<5.28> with a probability of [
please, provide the answer -____% - ] (Correct answer is 100)
# PARTICIPATION/EFFORT CHOICE If Phase III of the experiment corresponds to
SITUATION A as just described, will you perform the task or will you skip the task?
Remember that
• If you press the “I will perform the task” button and Phase III corresponds to SITUATION
A, you will have to wait 40 minutes anyway before proceeding to the questionnaire phase
• If you press the “I will skip the task” button and Phase III corresponds to SITUATION
A, you will proceed directly to the questionnaire phase
[ “I will perform the task” ] [ “I will skip the task” ]
23*** Situation B ***
In Situation B you will receive a guaranteed ﬁxed payment of €<5.28>
Your task (to count <goal> tables in 40 minutes) is supervised by an automatic supervisor
In this situation, the automatic supervisor might commit an error of observation
• If you accomplish the task (that is to correctly count the number of “1” in at least <goal>
tables),
– the supervisor with a probability of 80% will commit an evaluation error and it will
not assign to you the payment of €<11.88>
– the supervisor with a probability of 20% will commit no evaluation error and it will
assign to you the payment of €<11.88>
• If instead you do not accomplish the task (that is to correctly count the number of “1”
in at least <goal> tables), the supervisor will certainly (probability 100%) commit no
evaluation error and it will not assign to you the payment of €<11.88>
# CONTROL QUESTIONS
• In this situation, if you do accomplish the task, you will receive the €<11.88> payment
with a probability of [ please, provide the answer -_____%- ] (Correct answer is 20)
• In this situation, if you do not accomplish the task, you will receive the €<5.28> payment
ii) with a probability of [ please, provide the answer -_____%- ] (Correct answer is 100)
• In this situation, you will receive a ﬁxed payment of €<5.28> with a probability of [
please, provide the answer -____% - ] (Correct answer is 100)
# PARTICIPATION/EFFORT CHOICE If Phase III of the experiment corresponds to
SITUATION B as just described, will you perform the task or will you skip the task?
Remember that
• If you press the “I will perform the task” button and Phase III corresponds to SITUATION
B, you will have to wait 40 minutes anyway before proceeding to the questionnaire phase
• If you press the “I will skip the task” button and Phase III corresponds to SITUATION
B, you will proceed directly to the questionnaire phase
[ “I will perform the task” ] [ “I will skip the task” ]
24*** Situation C ***
In Situation C you will receive a guaranteed ﬁxed payment of €<5.28>
Your task (to count <goal> tables in 40 minutes) is supervised by an automatic supervisor
In this situation, the automatic supervisor might commit an error of observation
• If you accomplish the task (that is to correctly count the number of “1” in at least <goal>
tables), the supervisor will certainly (probability 100%) commit no evaluation error and
it will assign to you the payment of €<11.88>
• If instead you do not accomplish the task (that is to correctly count the number of “1” in
at least <goal> tables),
– the supervisor with a probability of 80% will commit an evaluation error and it will
assign to you the payment of €<11.88> €
– the supervisor with a probability of 20% will commit no evaluation error and it will
not assign to you the payment of €<11.88>
# CONTROL QUESTIONS
• In this situation, if you do accomplish the task, you will receive the €<11.88> payment
with a probability of [ please, provide the answer -_____%- ] (Correct answer is 100)
• In this situation, if you do not accomplish the task, you will receive the €<5.28> payment
ii) with a probability of [ please, provide the answer -_____%- ] (Correct answer is 20)
• In this situation, you will receive a ﬁxed payment of €<5.28> with a probability of [
please, provide the answer -____% - ] (Correct answer is 100)
# PARTICIPATION/EFFORT CHOICE If Phase III of the experiment corresponds to
SITUATION C as just described, will you perform the task or will you skip the task?
Remember that
• If you press the “I will perform the task” button and Phase III corresponds to SITUATION
C, you will have to wait 40 minutes anyway before proceeding to the questionnaire phase
• If you press the “I will skip the task” button and Phase III corresponds to SITUATION
C, you will proceed directly to the questionnaire phase
[ “I will perform the task” ] [ “I will skip the task” ]
Screenshots
25Figure 4: Screenshot of the SITUATION presentation and Control Questions
Figure 5: Screenshot of the Participation/Eﬀort Choice
26Figure 6: Screenshot of the Eﬀort task
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